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2.1  Introduction 
A debate got under way in 1991 over the advantages and disadvantages of a 
global trend toward three economic blocs-the  Western Hemisphere, centered 
on the United States; Europe, centered on the European Community (EC); and 
East Asia, centered on Japan. Krugman (1991a), Bhagwati (1990, 1992), and 
Bergsten (1991) argue that the trend is, on balance, bad. Krugman (1991b) 
and Lawrence (1991b) argue that it is, on balance, good.’ Most appear to agree, 
however, that a trend toward three blocs is indeed under way. 
There is no standard definition of an “economic bloc.” A useful definition 
might be a group of countries that are concentrating their trade and financial 
relationships with one another, in preference to the rest of the world. One might 
wish to add to the definition the criterion that this concentration is the outcome 
of  government policy, or at least of  factors that are noneconomic in origin, 
such as a common language or culture. In two out of  the three parts of the 
world, there have clearly heen recent deliberate political steps toward econo- 
mic integration. In Europe, the previously lethargic European Economic Com- 
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munity has burst forth with  the programs of  the Single Market, European 
Monetary Union, and more. In the Western Hemisphere, we have the Carib- 
bean  Basin  Initiative and  (more seriously) the  Canadian-U.S. Free  Trade 
Agreement, followed by the North America Free Trade Agreement and Enter- 
prise for the Americas Initiative.* 
In East Asia, by  contrast, overt preferential trading arrangements or other 
political moves to promote regional economic integration are lacking, as has 
been noted by  others (e.g., Petri 1992). The Association of  Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), to be sure, is taking steps in the direction of turning what 
used to be a regional security group into a free trade area of sorts. But when 
Americans worry as they are wont to do, about a trading bloc forming in Asia, 
it is generally not ASEAN that concerns them. Rather it is the possibility of an 
East Asia-  or Pacific-wide bloc dominated by Japan. 
Japan is unusual among major countries in not having preferential trading 
arrangements with  smaller neighboring countries. But  the hypothesis that 
has been put forward is that Japan is forming an economic bloc in the same 
way that it runs its economy: by  means of policies that are implicit, indirect, 
and invisible. Specifically, the hypothesis is that Japan operates, by  means of 
such instruments as flows of aid, foreign direct investment, and other forms of 
finance, to influence its neighbors’ trade toward it~elf.~  This is a hypothesis 
that should not be accepted uncritically, but needs to be examined empiri- 
cally. 
After examining some of  the relevant statistics, this paper argues that the 
evidence of an evolving East Asian trade bloc centered on Japan is not as clear 
as many believe. Trade between Japan and other Asian countries increased 
substantially in the late 1980s. But intraregional trade bias did not increase, 
as it did, for example, within the EC. The phrase yen bloc could be interpreted 
as referring to the financial and monetary aspects implicit in the words, rather 
than to trade flows. The second half of this paper does find a bit of evidence of 
Japanese influence in the Pacific via financial and monetary channels, rather 
than via trade flows. But it does not find evidence that the country has taken 
deliberate steps to establish a yen bloc. 
2.2  Is a Trade Bloc Forming in Pacific Asia? 
We must begin by acknowledging  the obvious: the greatly increased econo- 
mic weight of East Asian countries in the world. The rapid outward-oriented 
growth of Japan, followed by the four East Asian newly industrialized coun- 
tries (NICs) and more recently by some of the other ASEAN countries, is one 
of the most remarkable and widely remarked trends in the world economy over 
the last three decades. But when one asks whether a yen bloc is forming in 
(1992) and de la Torre and Kelly (1992). 
2. Reviews of  recent developments in  regional trading arrangements are offered by  Fieleke 
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Table 2.1  Summary Measures of Intraregional Trade Biases 
Western  European 
East Asia  Hemisphere  Community 
Intraregional trade/  1980  .23  .27 
total trade”  1985  .26  .3  1 




Intraregional bias,  1980  .91  .79 
holding constant  1985  .84  .78 




Bias, holding  1980  .70  .53 
constant for  1985  .40  .34 





‘Computed from IMF Direction of  Trade data. 
bComputed as the ratio of (intraregional trade/total trade) to shares of  world trade, as described 
in text. 
‘Gravity regressions, reported in tables 2.2-2.4.  They include significant coefficients on the APEC 
bloc, among other variables. 
East Asia, one is presumably asking something more than whether the econo- 
mies are getting larger, or even whether economic flows among them are in- 
creasing. One must ask whether the share of  intraregional trade is higher, or 
increasing more rapidly, than would be predicted based on such factors as the 
GNP or growth rates of the countries involved. 
2.2.1  Adjusting Intraregional Trade for Growth 
Table 2.1 reports three alternative ways  of  computing intraregional trade 
bias. The first part of the table is based on a simple breakdown of trade (exports 
plus imports) undertaken by countries in East Asia into trade with other mem- 
bers of the same regional grouping, versus trade with other parts of the 
For comparison, the analogous statistics are reported for Western Europe (the 
EC Twelve) and for North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico). 
The share of intraregional trade in East Asia increased from 23 percent in 
1980 to 29 percent in 1990. Pronouncements that a clubbish trading bloc is 
forming in the region are usually based on figures such as these. But the num- 
bers are deceptive. 
All three regions show increasing intragroup trade in the 1980s. The region 
that has both the highest and the fastest-increasing degree of intraregional trade 
is not Asia but the EC, reaching 47 percent in 1990. 
Quite aside from the comparison with Europe, it is easy to be misled by 
intraregional trade shares such as those reported in the first three rows of table 
4. Similar statistics are presented in more detail in table 1 in Frankel (1991a). 56  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
2.1. If one allows for the phenomenon that most of the East Asian countries in 
the 1980s experienced rapid growth in total output and trade, then it is possible 
that there has in fact been no movement toward intraregional bias in the evolv- 
ing pattern  of trade. The increase  in the intraregional share of  trade that is 
observed in table 2.1 could be entirely due to the increase in economic size of 
the countries. To take the simplest case, imagine that there were no intraregio- 
nal bias in 1980, that each East Asian country conducted trade with other East 
Asian countries in the same proportion as the latter’s weight in world trade (25 
percent). Total trade undertaken by Asian countries increased rapidly over this 
ten-year  period,  while  total trade worldwide increased  less rapidly. Even if 
there continued to be no regional bias in 1990, the observed intraregional share 
of  trade would have increased by one-third (to 31 percent) due solely to the 
greater weight of Asian countries in the world economy. 
Consider now the more realistic case where, due to transportation costs if 
nothing else, countries within each of the three groupings undertake trade that 
is somewhat biased toward trading partners within their own group (East Asia, 
North America, and the EC). Although East Asian trade with other parts of the 
world increased rapidly, trade with other Asian countries increased even more 
rapidly. Does this mean that the degree of clubbishness or within-region  bias 
intensified over this period? No, it does not. Even ifthere was no increase at 
all in the bias toward intra-Asian trade, the more rapid growth of total trade 
and output experienced by Asian countries would show up as a rate of growth 
of intra-Asian trade that was faster than the rate of growth of Asian trade with 
the rest of the world. 
Think of each East Asian country in  1980 as conducting trade with other 
East Asian  firms in the  same proportion as their weight  in  world trade (25 
percent) multiplied by a regional bias term to explain the actual share reported 
in table 2.1 (23 percent). Then the regional bias term would have to be 0.91 
(.23/.25).  An  unchanged  regional  bias term  multiplied  by  the  East Asians’ 
1990 weight in world trade would predict that the 1990 intraregional share of 
trade would be 28 percent (.91 X.31 = .28). This calculation turns out to ex- 
plain almost all of the increase in the actual intraregional share (to .29). Thus 
even with this very simple method of adjustment, the East Asian bias toward 
within-region  trade did not rise much in the 1980s. The implicit intraregional 
bias rose only from 0.91 to 0.93  (.29/.31),  as shown in the  middle rows of 
table 2.1  .5 
2.2.2  A Test on Bilateral Trade Flows 
The analysis should be elaborated by  use of  a systematic framework for 
measuring what patterns of bilateral trade are normal around the world: the so- 
5. Petri (1991) calls this measure the “double-relative,” while Drysdale and Garnaut (1992) and 
Anderson and Norheim (1992) use similar calculations of  “intensity-of-trade indexes.” All find 
that, once one holds constant for growth in this simple way, the existing intraregional bias in Asia 
did not increase in the 1980s. 57  Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific? 
called gravity  A dummy variable can then be added to represent when 
both countries in a given pair belong to the same regional grouping, and one 
can check whether the level and time trend in the East Asia-Pacific  grouping 
exceeds that in other groupings. We do not currently have measures of histori- 
cal, political, cultural, and linguistic ties. Thus it will be possible to interpret 
the dummy variables as reflecting these factors, rather than necessarily as re- 
flecting discriminatory trade policies. Perhaps we should not regret the merg- 
ing of  these different factors in one term, because as noted there are in any 
case no overt preferentid trading arrangements on which theories of a Japanese 
trading bloc could rely.’ 
The dependent variable is trade (exports plus imports), in log form, between 
pairs of  countries in a given year. I have sixty-three countries in my data set, 
so that there are 1,953 data points (63 X 6212) for a given year. There are some 
missing values (245 of them in 1985, for example), normally due to levels of 
trade too small to be recorded.*  The possibility that the exclusion of these data 
points might bias the results, or that the results might be subject to heterosce- 
dasticity because country size varies so much, is considered in Frankel and 
Wei (1992a). The results appear to be robust with respect to these problems. 
One would expect the two most important factors in explaining bilateral 
trade flows to be the geographical distance between the two countries and their 
economic size. These factors are the essence of the gravity model, by analogy 
with the law  of  gravitational attraction between masses. A large part of  the 
apparent bias toward intraregional trade is certainly due to simple geographical 
proximity. Indeed, Krugman  (1991b) suggests that  most of  it  may  be  due 
to proximity, so that the three trading blocs are welfare-improving “natural” 
groupings (as distinct from “unnatural” trading arrangements between distant 
trading partners such as the United States and Israel). Although the importance 
of  distance and transportation costs is clear, there is not a lot of  theoretical 
guidance on precisely how they should enter. I experiment a bit with functional 
forms. I also add a dummy ADJACENT variable to indicate when two countries 
share a common border. 
The basic equation to be estimated is 
log(ql) = (Y  + p ,log(GNP,GNP,) + p,log(GNPlpop,GNP/pop,) 
+ p,log(DISTANCE)  + PJADJACENT) 
+ y,(EC,)  + y2  (WY,)  + y,(EA,,)  + u,,. 
The last four explanatory factors are dummy variables. The goal, again, is to 
see how much of the high level of trade within the East Asian region can be 
6. See Deardorff (1984, 503-4)  for a survey of the (short) subject of gravity equations. Wang 
and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) have recently applied the gravity model to 
the question of potential Eastern European trade patterns. 
7. Krugman (1991b) made a crude first pass at applying the gravity model to the question of 
whether Europe and North America are separate trading blocs, hut did not get as far as including 
other countries or including a variable for distance. 
8. The list of  countries and regional groupings appears in the appendix. 58  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
explained by  simple economic factors common to bilateral trade throughout 
the world, and how  much is left over to be  attributed to a special regional 
effe~t.~ 
The  practice  of  entering  GNPs  in  product  form  is  empirically  well- 
established in bilateral trade regressions. It can be easily justified by  the mod- 
ern theory of trade under imperfect competition.1° In addition there is reason 
to believe that GNP per capita has a positive effect, for a given size: as coun- 
tries become more developed, they tend to specialize more and to trade more. 
It  is also possible that the infrastructure necessary to conduct trade-ports, 
airports, and so forth-becomes  better developed with the level of GNP per 
capita. 
The results are reported in tables 2.2-2.4.  I found all three variables to be 
highly significant statistically (>99 percent level). The coefficient on the log of 
distance was about -0.56, when the adjacency variable (which is also highly 
significant statistically) is included at the same time. This means that when the 
distance between two nonadjacent countries is higher by  1 percent, the trade 
between them falls by  about 0.56 percent.’’ 
I tested for possible nonlinearity in the log-distance term, as it could concei- 
vably be the cause of any apparent bias toward intraregional trade that is left 
after controlling linearly for distance. Quadratic and cubic terms turned out to 
be not at all significant. An alternative specification that fits at least as well as 
the log is to include the level of distance and its square. The significant positive 
coefficient on the latter confirms the property of the log that “trade resistance” 
increases less than linearly with distance. The results for the other coefficients 
are little affected by the choice of functional form for proximity. I report here 
only results using the log of distance. 
The estimated coefficient on GNP per capita is about 0.29 as of  1980, indi- 
cating that richer countries do indeed trade more, though this term declines 
during the 1980s, reaching 0.08 in 1990. The estimated coefficient for the log 
of the product of the two countries’ GNPs is about 0.75, indicating that, though 
trade increases with size, it increases less than proportionately (holding GNP 
per capita constant). This presumably reflects the widely known pattern that 
small economies tend to be more open to international trade than larger, more 
diversified economies. 
If there were nothing to the notion of  trading blocs, then these basic vari- 
9. Bilateral distances were computed between the main cities reported in the appendix. 
10. The specification implies that trade between two equal-sized countries (say, of  size .5) will 
be greater than trade between a large and a small country (say, of size .9 and .I). This property of 
models with imperfect competition is not a property of the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory of 
comparative advantage (Helpman 1987; Helpman and Krugman 1985, sec. 1.5). Foundations for 
the gravity model are also offered by  Anderson (1979) and other papers surveyed by  Deardorff 
(1984, 503-6). 
11. The coefficient on the log of  distance is about 0.8 when the adjacency variable is not in- 
cluded. Table 2.2  Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade, 1980 
Per Capita  Western  Asian  Pacific 
C  GNPs  GNPs  Distance  Adjacent  EC  Hemisphere  ASEAN  EAEC  Pacific  APEC  Rim  R2m'  SEE" 
-  11.36**  .763** 
(.56)  (.018) 
(.55)  (.017) 
(.55)  (.017) 
(.54)  (.017) 
(.55)  (.017) 
(.53)  (.017) 
(.55)  (.017) 
(S6)  (.018) 
(.55)  (.017) 
-  12.05**  .759** 
-  12.05**  .759** 
-11.97**  .753** 
-12.13""  .753** 
-11.09**  .733** 
-11.58**  .739** 
-10.83**  .762** 




























































































































1.321 **  0.0076 
(.248)  (.0129) 
.68/.68  1.26 
.70/.70  1.23 
.70/.70  1.23 
.71/.71  1.21 
.71/.71  1.21 
.71/.71  1.21 
.71/.71  1.20 
.68/.68  1.27 
.71/.71  1.20 
- 
Notes:* and ** are significance at the 95 and 99 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. LHS variable (bilateral exports 
and imports) and first three RHS variables are in log form. All others are dummy variables. 
%tandad error of estimate. Table 2.3  Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade, 1985 
Per Capita  Western  Asian  Pacific 
C  GNPs  GNPs  Distance  Adjacent  EC  Hemisphere  ASEAN  EAEC  Pacific  APEC  Rim  RZ/RZ SEE" 
-  10.54**  .791** 
(S3)  (.017) 
(S2)  (.017) 
(.52)  (.017) 
(S1)  (.017) 
(.51)  (.017) 
(S1)  (.017) 
(S2)  (.017) 
(S3)  (.017) 
(S3)  (.017) 
-10.92**  .784** 
-10.92**  .784** 
-  10.85**  .778** 
-10.91**  .778** 
-10.07**  .761** 
-  10.42**  .765** 
-10.09**  .791** 





















































































































,721.72  1.21 
,731.73  1.19 
,731.73  1.19 
,731.73  1.18 
.73/.73  1.18 
1.522**  ,741.74  1.17 
(.130) 
1.029**  ,741.74  1.17 
(.244) 
0.041**  ,721.72  1.20 
(.013) 
I .034**  0.030*  ,741.74  1.17 
(.244)  (.013) 
Notes: tt,  *, and **  denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. LHS variable (bilateral 
exports and imports) and first three RHS variables are in log form. All others are dummy variables. 
"Standard error of estimate. Table 2.4  Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade, 1990 
Per Capita  Western  Asian  Pacific 
C  GNPs  GNPs  Distance  Adjacent  EC  Hemisphere  ASEAN  EAEC  Pacific  APEC  Rim  R2m'  SEE" 
.75/.75  1.11  2.77**  .787**  .078**  -.589**  .732**  0.341*  0.934**  1.879** 
(.36)  (.016)  (.017)  (.038)  (.166)  (.166)  (.148)  (.378) 
,761.76  1.09  2.54**  .779**  .082**  -.559**  .794**  0.412*  0.957**  1.997** 
(.35)  (.016)  (.017)  (.038)  (.162)  (.163)  (.145)  (.215) 
2.54**  .779**  .082**  -.559**  .797**  0.412*  0.955**  -0.109  2.032**  .76/.76  1.09 
(.35)  (.016)  (.017)  (.038)  (.163)  (.163)  (.145)  (.450)  (.261) 
,771.77  1.08  2.57**  .773**  .86**  -.561**  .790**  0.437**  0.983**  1.746** 
(.35)  (.016)  (.016)  (.037)  (.160)  (.160)  (.143)  (.152) 
2.52**  .773**  .087**  -.555**  .794**  0.446**  0.986**  -0.107  0.612tT  1.456**  ,771.77  1.08 
(.35)  (.016)  (.016)  (.037)  (.160)  (.160)  (.143)  (43)  (.331)  (.213) 
3.02**  .756**  .083**  -.597**  .730**  0.444**  0.948**  1.597**  ,771.77  1.07 
(.34)  (.016)  (.016)  (.036)  (.158)  (.159)  (.141)  (.128) 
2.83**  .760**  .085**  -.579**  .750**  0.460**  0.967**  -0.144  0.604.tt  0.289  1.194**  ,771.77  1.07 
(.35)  (.016)  (.016)  (.037)  (.159)  (.159)  (.142)  (.440)  (.328)  (.309)  (.231) 
3.04**  .788**  .073**  -.619**  .780**  0.296tt  0.789**  0.015  ,751.74  1.12 
(.37)  (.017)  (.017)  (.040)  (.167)  (.167)  (.170)  (.013) 
2.87**  .760**  .086**  -.584**  .743**  0.454**  0.925**  -0.143  0.600tt  0.284  1.196**  6.39X10-'  ,771.77  1.07 
(.38)  (.016)  (.016)  (.038)  (.160)  (.159)  (.163)  (40)  (.328)  (.309)  (.231)  (.012) 
Notes: tt. *, and **  denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. LHS variable (bilateral 
exports and imports) and first three RHS variables are in log form. All others are dummy variables. 
"Standard error of estimate. 62  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
ables would soak up most of the explanatory power. There would be little left 
to attribute to a dummy variable representing whether two trading partners are 
both located in the same region. In this case the level and trend in intraregional 
trade would be due solely to the proximity of the countries and to their rapid 
rate of overall economic growth. But I found that dummy variables for intrare- 
gional trade are statistically significant, both in East Asia and elsewhere in the 
world. If two countries are both located in the Western Hemisphere, for exam- 
ple, they will trade with each other by an estimated 70 percent more than they 
would otherwise, even after taking into account distance and the other gravity 
variables (exp(.53) = 1.70). Intraregional trade goes beyond what can be ex- 
plained by proximity. 
The empirical equation is as yet too far removed from theoretical founda- 
tions to allow conclusions to be drawn regarding economic welfare. But it is 
possible that the amount of intraregional bias explained by proximity, as com- 
pared to explicit or implicit regional trading arrangements, is small enough in 
my results that those arrangements  are welfare-reducing. This could be  the 
case if trade diversion outweighs trade creation. Inspired by Krugman’s (1  99  1  a, 
1991b) “natural trading bloc” terminology, we might then refer to the observed 
intraregional trade bias as evidence of “super-natural” trading blocs. The issue 
merits future research. 
When the boundaries of the Asian bloc are drawn along the lines of those 
suggested by  Malaysian prime minister Mahathir in his proposed East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), which excludes Australia and New Zealand (in the 
second row of tables 2.2-2.4), the coefficient on the Asian bloc appears to be 
the strongest and most significant of any in the world. Even when the bounda- 
ries are drawn in this way, however, there is no evidence of an increase in the 
intraregional  bias of Asian trade during the  1980s: the estimated coefficient 
actually decreases somewhat from I980 to 1990. Thus the gravity results cor- 
roborate the back-of-the-envelope calculation reported in the preceding  sec- 
tion. The precise pattern is a decrease in the first half of the decade, followed 
by  a  very  slight  increase  in  the  second  half,  matching  the  results  of  Petri 
(1991).12  None of these changes over time is statistically significant. 
It is perhaps surprising that the estimated Level of the intraregional trade bias 
was higher in East Asia as of 1980 than in the other two regions. One possible 
explanation is that there has historically been a sort of trading culture in Asia. 
To the extent that such a culture exists and can be identified with a particular 
nation or ethnic group, I find the overseas Chinese to be a more plausible factor 
than  the Japanese. But there are other possible regional effects that may be 
showing up spuriously as an East Asian bloc, to be considered below. 
Of the three trading blocs, the EC and the Western Hemisphere are the two 
that show rapid intensification  in the course of the  1980s. Both show an ap- 
12. Petri infers, from the data on intraregional trade shares, a decrease in East Asian interdepen- 
dence up to the middle of the I980s, followed by a reversal in the second half of the decade. 63  Is Japan Creating a Yen  Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific? 
proximate doubling of  their estimated intraregional bias coefficients. As  of 
1980, trade within the EC is not strong enough-after  holding constant for 
the close geographical proximity and high incomes per capita of  European 
countries-for  the bias coefficient of 0.2 to appear statistically significant. The 
EC coefficient increased rapidly in level and significance in the first half of the 
1980s, reaching about 0.4 by  1985, and continued to increase a bit in the sec- 
ond half. The effect of  two countries being located in Europe per se, when 
tested, does not show up as being nearly as strong in magnitude or significance 
as the effect of membership in the EC per se. 
The Western Hemisphere coefficient experienced all its increase in the sec- 
ond half of the decade, exceeding 0.9 by  1990. The rapid increase in the West- 
ern Hemisphere intraregional bias in the second half of the 1980s is in itself 
an important new finding. The recovery of Latin American imports from the 
United States after the compression that followed the 1982 debt crisis must be 
part of  this phenomenon. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement signed in 
1988 may also be part of the explanation. 
I consider a sequence of nested candidates for trading blocs in the Pacific. 
The significance of a given bloc effect turns out to depend on what other blocs 
are tested at the same time. One logical way to draw the boundaries is to in- 
clude all the countries with eastern coasts on the Pacific, adding Australia and 
New  Zealand to the EAEC group. I call this grouping Asian Pacific in the 
tables. Its coefficient and significance level are both higher than the EAEC 
dummy. When I broaden the bloc search and test for an effect of  the Asia 
Pacific  Economic Cooperation (APEC) group,  which  includes the United 
States and Canada with the others, it is highly significant. The significance of 
the Asian Pacific dummy completely disappears. The EAEC dummy remains 
significant in 1980 and 1990, though at a lower level than the initial results that 
did not consider any wider Pacific groupings. 
APEC appears to be the correct place to draw the boundary. When I test for 
the broadest definition of a Pacific bloc, including Latin America, it is not at 
all significant, and the other coefficients do not change. (It is called Pacific 
Rim in the tables.) It remains true that the intraregional biases in the EC and 
Western Hemisphere blocs each roughly doubled from  1980 to  1990, while 
intraregional biases in the Asia and Pacific areas did not increase at all. The 
only surprising new finding is the APEC effect: the United States and Canada 
appear to be full partners in the Pacific bloc, even while belonging to the sig- 
nificant but distinct Western Hemisphere bloc. The APEC coefficient is the 
strongest of any. Its estimate holds relatively steady at 1.3 (1980), 1.0 (1985), 
and  1.2 (1990). The implication is that a pair of APEC countries trade three 
times as much as two otherwise similar countries (exp (1.2) = 3.3).13 
13. Others have emphasized the high volume of transpacific trade. But it has been difficult to 
evaluate such statistics when no account is taken of  these countries’ collective size. A higher 
percentage of economic activity will consist of intraregional trade in a larger region than in a 
smaller region, even when there is no intraregional bias, merely because smaller regions tend by 64  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
One possible explanation for the apparent intraregional trade biases within 
East Asia and within the APEC grouping is that transportation between Asian 
Pacific countries is mostly by water, while transportation among European or 
Western Hemisphere countries is more often overland, and that ocean shipping 
is less expensive than shipping by rail or road. This issue bears further investi- 
gation. (Wang [1992] enters land distance and water distance separately in a 
gravity model. She finds a small, though statistically significant, difference in 
coefficients.) The issue of water versus land transport should not affect results 
regarding changes in intraregional trade bias in the 1980s, however, given that 
the nature of shipping costs does not appear to have changed over as short a 
time span as five or ten years. 
Several further questions naturally arise. ASEAN negotiated  a preferential 
trading arrangement within its membership in 1977 although serious progress 
in removal of barriers did not get under way until 1987 (Jackson 199  1). In early 
1992 the members proclaimed plans for an ASEAN free trade area, albeit with 
exemptions for many sectors. Does this grouping constitute a small bloc nested 
within the others? I include in my model a dummy variable for common mem- 
bership in ASEAN. It turns out to have a significant coefficient only if none of 
the broader Asian blocs are included. The conclusion seems to be that ASEAN 
is not in fact functioning as a trading bloci4 
We know that Singapore and Hong Kong are especially open countries and 
engage in a large amount of entrep6t trade. A dummy variable for these two 
countries’ trade with other Asian Pacific countries is highly significant when 
it is included, as shown in the first row of  table 2.5. Its presence reduces a 
bit the coefficient on the East Asian grouping, but does not otherwise change 
the results. 
We also know that most East Asian countries are very open to trade of all 
sorts. So I added a dummy variable to indicate when at least one of the pair 
of  countries is located in East Asia, to supplement the dummy variable that 
indicates  when  both  are.  Its  coefficient  is  significant.  It  is  also  positive, 
which appears to rule out any “trade-diversion” effects arising from the exist- 
ence of the East Asian  bloc:  these countries  trade  an estimated 22 percent 
more with all parts of the world, other things equal, than do average countries 
(exp[.201 = 1.22). The addition of the openness dummy reduces a bit more the 
level and significance of the East Asian bloc dummy. Indeed, when the APEC 
bloc dummy and East Asian openness dummy are both added at the same time, 
the East Asian  bloc  term becomes  only marginally  significant  in 1980 and 
insignificant in 1985 and 1990. There may be no East Asian bloc effect at all! 
their nature to trade across their boundaries more than larger ones. In the limit, when the unit is 
the world, 100 percent of trade is intra-“regional.” 
14. In tests similar to mine, Wang (1992). Wang and Winters (1991), and Hamilton and Winters 
(1992) found the ASEAN dummy to reflect one of the most significant trading areas in the world. 
That they did not include a broader dummy variable for intra-Asian trade may explain the differ- 
ence in results. Table 2.5  Gravity Estimates with Allowance for Asian Openness 
Per 
Capita  # of 
GNP  GNP  Distance  Adjacent  WH  EA  APEC  EC  JapEA  HKSEA  HKSl  EAl  Adj. R21SEE  Observations 
.78**  .24** 
.73**  .31** 
.78**  .26** 
(.02)  (.02) 
(.02)  (.02) 
(.02)  (.02) 
.78**  .22** 
.76**  .26** 
.78**  .23** 
(.02)  (.02) 
(.02)  (.02) 
(.02)  (.02) 
.80**  .04** 
(.02)  (.02) 
.75**  .lo** 
(.02)  (.02) 
.79**  .06** 




















.58**  .51tt  1.29**  .I8  -.I1 
(.15)  (.34)  (.17)  (.18)  (.16) 
.65**  .31  1.22**  .18  -.12 
(.15)  (.34)  (.17)  (.18)  (.49) 
.64**  .53t  1.19**  .15  -.I6 
(.15)  (.34)  (.17)  (.17)  (.48) 
1985 
.37*  .36  1.18**  .45**  .09 
(.15)  (.26)  (.17)  (.17)  (.16) 
.42**  .I6  1.10**  .44*  -.08 
(.15)  (.34)  (.17)  (.18)  (.48) 
.41**  .26  1.09**  .44*  -.lo 
(.15)  (.34)  (.17)  (.18)  (.48) 
1990 
.97**  .40t  1.18**  .49**  -.15 
(.13)  (.23)  (.15)  (.16)  (.14) 
1.06**  .I4  1.11**  .49**  -.27 
(.14)  (.30)  (.15)  (.16)  (.43) 
1.03**  .34  1.08**  .49**  -.31 




1.16**  .25** 






.59**  .20* 




1.06**  .25** 




















Notes: t, tt, *, and ** denote significance at the 85, 90, 95, and 99 percent levels respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
All regressions have an intercept, which is not reported here. All variables except the dummies are in logs. JapEA=trade between Japan 
and other East Asian countries, HKSEA=trade between Hong Kong or Singapore and other East Asian countries, HKSl =trade between 
Hong Kong or Singapore and any other countries, EAl=trade involving at least one East Asian country. 66  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
I tried a few more extensions as well. I disaggregated trade into manufac- 
tured goods, agricultural products, fuels, and other raw materials. The results 
changed little. Raw materials show the greatest Asian bloc effect if judged by 
the estimated coefficient. Manufactures shows the greatest effect if judged by 
t-statistics. Desirable extensions for the future, besides further disaggregation, 
include adding factor-endowment terms. 
What about bilateral trade between Asian Pacific countries and Japan in par- 
ticular? Like intraregional trade overall, trade with Japan increased rapidly in 
the second half of the 1980s. Most of this increase merely reversed a decline 
in the first half of the 1980s, however (Petri 1991). More important, the recent 
trend in  bilateral trade between  Japan and its neighbors can be readily  ex- 
plained as the natural outcome of  the growth in Japanese trade overall and 
the growth in trade levels attained by other Asian countries overall. Lawrence 
(1991a) has calculated that, out of the 28 percentage-point increase in the mar- 
ket share of Asian Pacific developing countries in Japanese imports from 1985 
to  1988, 11 percentage points is attributable to the commodity mix of these 
countries’ exports. There is no residual to be attributed to Japan’s development 
of special trading relations with other countries in its region.15 
I confirmed this finding (though without as yet decomposing trade by com- 
modity) by adding to my gravity model a separate dummy variable for bilateral 
Asian trade with Japan in particular. It was not even remotely statistically sig- 
nificant in any year, and indeed the point estimate was a small negative number, 
as is shown in table 2.5. Thus there was no evidence that Japan has established 
or come to dominate a trading bloc in Asia. 
To  summarize the most relevant effects, if two countries both lie within the 
boundaries of APEC, they trade with each other a little over three times as 
much as they otherwise would. The nested EAEC bloc is less strong (espe- 
cially if one allows also for the openness of  East Asian countries) and has 
declined a bit in magnitude and significance during the course of the  1980s. 
The Western Hemisphere and EC blocs, by contrast, intensified rapidly during 
the decade. Indeed, by  1990 the Western Hemisphere bloc was stronger than 
the EAEC bloc, if  one takes into account the existence of the APEC effect. 
There was never a special Japan effect within Asian Pacific. 
In short, beyond the evident facts that countries near each other trade with 
each other, and that Japan and other Asian countries are growing rapidly, there 
is no evidence that Japan is concentrating its trade with other Asian countries 
in any special way, nor that they are collectively moving toward a trading bloc 
in the way that Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere appear to be. I 
now turn from trade to finance. 
15. The empirical literature on whether Japan  is an outlier in its trading patterns, particularly 
with respect to imports of manufactures, includes Saxonhouse (1989), Noland (1991), and Law- 
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2.3  Japan’s Financial Influence in the Region 
In the case of financial flows, proximity is less important than it is for trade 
flows. For some countries  the buying  and  selling of  foreign  exchange and 
highly rated bonds is characterized by  the absence of  significant government 
capital controls, transactions costs, or information costs. In such cases, there 
would  be no particular reason  to expect greater capital  flows among close 
countries than among distant ones. Rather, each country would be viewed as 
depositing into the world capital pool, or borrowing from it, whatever quantity 
of funds it wished at the going world interest rate. Thus even if we could obtain 
reliable data on bilateral capital flows (which we cannot), and whatever pattern 
they happened to show, such statistics would not be particularly interesting. 
2.3.1 
Many Asian countries still have substantial capital controls, and financial 
markets that are in other respects  less than  fully developed. Even financial 
markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, the most open in Asia, retain  some 
minor frictions. Where the links with world capital markets are obstructed by 
even small barriers, it is an interesting question to ask whether those links are 
stronger with some major financial centers than with others. This question is 
explored econometrically below. 
Information costs exist for equities, and for bonds with some risk of default. 
These costs may be smaller for those investors who are physically, linguisti- 
cally, and culturally close to the nation where the borrower resides. Proximity 
clearly matters as well in the case of direct investment, in part because much 
of direct investment is linked to trade, in part because linguistic and cultural 
proximity matter for direct investment. We begin our consideration of capital 
links by looking at direct investment. 
2.3.2  Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 2.6 shows the standard Ministry of Finance figures for Japanese direct 
investment. The steady stream of direct investment by Japanese firms in East 
Asia and the Pacific (including Australia) has received much attention. But the 
table shows that, whether measured  in  terms of  annual flows or cumulated 
stocks, Japan’s direct investment  in the region is approximately equal to its 
investment in Europe, and is much less than its investment in North America 
(see also Komiya and Wakasugi 1991). 
It has been argued that, once one scales the table 2.6 figures for GNP among 
the host countries, an Asian bias to Japanese direct investment might indeed 
appear (Holloway  1991, 69). But if one scales the foreign direct investment 
figures by the host region’s role in world trade, one finds that Japan’s investment 
in Asia and Oceania is almost exactly in proportion to their size. There is no 
regional bias. Its direct investment in the United States and Canada, on the 
Tokyo’s Influence on Regional Financial Markets Table 2.6  Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment, by Area and Country (amounts in millions of dollars) 
Cumulative Total FY 
FY 1990  FY 1991  195  1-9  1 
Cases  Amount  % of Total  Cases  Amount  % of Total  Cases  Amount  % of Total 
United States 
Canada 







































































45.9  1,607  18,026 
1.9  107  797 
47.8  1,714  18,823 
6.4  290  3,337 
0.0  10  90 
25.1  803  9,371 
1 .o  76  748 
7.3  394  3,278 
1.9  148  1,193 
3.1  178  925 
1.5  103  613 
0.5  48  260 
0.6  246  579 
2.0  258  807 
1.3  136  880 
0.8  87  405 
0.5  42  203 
0.1  9  14 
0.0  7  4 
1  0 
0.0  2  14 
0.1  12  39 

























24,55 1  148,554 
1,388  6,454 
25,939  155,008 
7,487  43,821 
350  3,522 
8,228  68,636 
1,534  6,574 
4,351  21,376 
2,021  12,733 
3,921  10,775 
2,662  7,168 
1,895  4,398 
1,105  3,402 
2,723  5,229 
1,645  4,111 
2,487  3,135 
892  1,783 
176  210 
126  102 
32  109 
60  124 
166  175 
19,911  53,455 
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other hand, is more than twice what one would expect from their share of world 
trade. Japan’s investment in Europe is about half the continent’s share of trade. 
Furthermore, Ramstetter (1991a, 8-9;  1991b, 95-96)  has forcefully pointed 
out that the standard Ministry of  Finance figures on Japanese foreign direct 
investment actually represent  statistics on investment either approved by  or 
reported to the government, and greatly overstate the extent of true Japanese 
investment in developing countries. The more accurate balance-of-payments 
data from the Bank of  Japan show a smaller percentage of investment going 
to Asia. 
2.3.3  Tokyo versus New York Effects on Asian Interest Rates 
Statistics also exist on Japanese portfolio investment. But, in the case of 
portfolio capital, looking at quantity data is not as informative as looking at 
price data-that  is, at interest rates. For one thing, the quality of the data on 
interest rates is much higher than the quality of the data on capital flows. For 
another, the interest rate test is more appropriate conceptually. If the potential 
for arbitrage keeps the interest rate in a given Asian country closely in line 
with, say, Tokyo interest rates, then this constitutes good evidence of close 
links between the two national capital markets, even if  the amount of actual 
arbitrage or other capital flow that takes place within a given period happens 
to be small. 
Many East Asian countries have moved to liberalize and internationalize 
their financial markets over the last ten to fifteen years.I6  A number of studies 
have documented Japan’s removal of capital controls over the period 1979-84 
by looking at the power of arbitrage to equalize interest rates between Tokyo 
and New York or L0ndon.I’ Australia and New Zealand, while lagging behind 
Japan, also show signs of liberalization during the course of the 1980~.’~  Hong 
Kong and Singapore register  impressively open financial markets,  showing 
smaller interest differentials even than some open European countries like Ger- 
many. (Hong Kong has long had open capital markets. Singapore undertook 
a major  liberalization  in  1978, though  it has tried to segment its domestic 
money market from its offshore “Asia dollar market.”  19)  Malaysia has officially 
liberalized, following Singapore (Abidin 1986; Glick and Hutchison 1990,45), 
though its covered differential has remained considerably higher. 
16. Frankel (1991~)  presents the 1980s evidence for Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Faruqee (1991) examines interest differentials for Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand (vis-8-vis yen interest rates in London) but does not take into account 
exchange rate expectations. 
17. These include Otani and Tiwari (1981), Ito (1986). and Frankel (1984). The interest rates in 
the calculations are covered on the forward exchange or Eurocurrency markets so as to avoid 
exchange risk. (Tests that look at real or uncovered interest differentials, rather than covered inter- 
est differentials, include Ito [I9881 and Fukao and Okubo [1984].) 
18. The frequently large negative covered differential that had been observed for Australia up 
to mid-1983 (see, e.g., Argy 1987) largely vanished thereafter. 
19. See Moreno (1988). Edwards and Khan (1985) include another test of covered interest parity 
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We can apply a simple test to the hypothesis that a particular Asian country 
is dominated financially by Japan, versus the alternative hypothesis that ties to 
capital markets in the other industrialized countries are equally strong. I ran 
the following OLS regression to see how the interest rate in a typical Asian 
country depends on interest rates in Tokyo and New York: 
Under the null hypothesis that the country's financial markets are insufficiently 
developed or liberalized to be directly tied to any foreign financial markets, 
the coefficients on foreign interest rates should be zero. Under the alternative 
hypothesis  that  the country's  financial  markets  are closely tied to those  in 
Tokyo, the coefficient on Tokyo interest rates should be closer to one than to 
zero, and similarly for New York.20 
Table 2.7 presents estimates for three-month interest rates in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, on quarterly data. For the Hong Kong interest rate, the influence of 
the New York market appears very strong. This is not surprising: not only does 
the colony  have open financial  markets, but its currency has since October 
1983 been pegged to the U.S. dollar (see, e.g., Balassa and Williamson 1990, 
32), so that there  is nothing to inhibit perfect arbitrage between its interest 
rates and U.S. interest rates. Tokyo, London, and Frankfurt had no significant 
influence  in Hong  Kong on average over the  sample period  (from  1976 to 
1989). For the Singapore interest rate, the influence of New York is again very 
significant,  but  now  there  is  also  a  significant,  though  smaller,  weight  on 
Tokyo. The evidence suggests that both countries have had open financial mar- 
kets ever since the mid-l970s, with New York having the dominant influence, 
but with Tokyo also having a one-quarter effect in the case of Singapore. 
To see whether the influence of the foreign financial centers changed over 
the course of  the sample period, we can allow for time trends in the coeffi- 
cients, also reported in table 2.7. For Hong Kong, it is clear that London used 
to have a strong influence, and equally clear that the British influence has been 
diminishing over time. For Singapore, there is no sign of change in New York's 
role, but there is weak evidence of a gradually increasing role for Tokyo. 
The next step is to expand the sample of countries. Some Asian countries, 
such as Korea and Taiwan, did not seriously begin to open their financial mar- 
kets to external influence by any foreign center until the late 1980s. To obtain 
more observations, one can switch to monthly data. Preliminary results for the 
period  1988-91  found a dominant role for Tokyo interest rates in Singapore 
and Taiwan, a dominant role for New York interest rates in Hong Kong and 
Australia, and apparently strong roles for both in Korea (Frankel 1991a, table 
20. It  should be noted that if  capital markets in Tokyo and New York are closely tied to each 
other, as they indeed are, then multicollinearity might make it difficult to obtain statistically sig- 
nificant estimates. But this does not mean that there is anything wrong with the test. A finding that 
the coefficient on the Tokyo interest rate is statistically greater than zero, or  than the coefficient 
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Table 2.7  Japanese, US.,  U.K., and German Interest Rate Effects in Hong 
Kong and Singapore 
Hong Kong  Singapore 
Without  Without 
Trend  With Trend  trend  With Trend 
Constant term 
Tokyo effect 
Time trend in Tokyo effect 
New York effect 
Time trend in  New York 
effect 
Londdn effect 
Time trend in London effect 
Frankfurt effect 




-2.4  I tt  -  1.70 
(1.08)  (1.13) 
-0.23  -0.1  1 
(0.17)  (0.69) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
I .32**  0.61 
(0.15)  (0.52) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.10  1.38** 
(0.11)  (0.47) 
-  0.03 ** 
(0.01) 
0.14  -  1.74tt 
(0.20)  (1.13) 
0.W.t 
(0.02) 
33  35 
1.50  1.61 
1976.4 to 1989.3 
-1.16tt  -0.65 
(0.67)  (0.67) 
0.23**  -0.36tt 
(0.07)  (0.22) 
0.02tt 
(0.01) 
0.75**  0.65tt 
~09)  (0.33) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.07  -0.09 
(0.06)  (0.16) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.19  1.02tt 
(0.12)  (0.54) 
-0.02tt 
(0.01) 
37  .88 
1.53  1.92 
1974.1 to 1988.1 
tt and **  denote significance at the 90 and 99 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors appear 
in parentheses. 
4; or NBER Working Paper no. 4050, table 7). Tests that also allowed a role 
for Frankfurt and London interest rates found apparently significant effects for 
the latter in Australia and New Zealand. But most of these results were tainted 
by high levels of serial correlation. 
In table 2.8 I use conservative standard errors, to allow for the problem cre- 
ated by serial correlation. I expand the set of countries still further, to a set of 
ten  (with three alternative  measures of  the Korean  interest  rate).  The time 
trends in the coefficients tell us that New York seems to be gaining influence 
at the expense of Tokyo in the English-speaking  countries of the Pacific Rim 
(Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), while the reverse is occurring in a num- 
ber of East Asian countries. The observed shift in influence from New York 
interest rates to Tokyo interest rates is highly significant in the case of Indone- 
sia, and somewhat less so in the case of Korea. It is positive but not significant 
(when the conservative standard errors are used) for Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Malaysia. 
These tests leave some important questions unanswered.  Are the barriers Table 2.8  Trends in the Influence of Dollar versus Yen Interest Rates (September 1982-March 
1992) 
- 
Constant  Eurodollar  Eurodollar Trend  Euroyen  Euroyen Trend  R2  DW  Q 










[0.58  I] 
(1.087) 
[3.262] 
Canada  0.535 
Hong Kong  -4.115 
Indonesia  14.010** 
Korea 1  9.094** 
Korea 2  16.294** 
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0.086 
(0.09  1) 
[O. I581 
.52  0.409  141.47** 
.79  0.477  158.12** 
.71  1.047  41.35** 
.33  0.700  N.A. 
.82  0.488  124.18** 
.64  0.671  57.01** Korea 3  10.079** 
(0.690) 
[2.070] 










Thailand  -3.846 
(  1.1  14) 
[3.341] 
New Zealand  18.573** 



















-0.061  -0.019 
(0.026)  (0.23 1) 
[0.045]  [0.4001 
-0.072  0.700 
(0.049)  (0.453) 
[0.086]  [0.784] 
0.379**  3.405** 
(0.074)  (0.742) 
[O. 1291  [1.285] 
-0.052*  0.174 
(0.014)  (0.142) 
[0.025]  [0.246] 
0.017  0.811 
(0.043)  (0.437) 
[0.075]  [0.757] 
-0.069  1.363* 
(0.039)  (0.363) 
[0.068]  [0.628] 
0.124* 

















.69  0.204  194.35** 
.41  0.463  N.A. 
.37  0.327  204.22** 
.86  0.842  103.64** 
.45  0.422  109.01** 
.78  0.461  N.A. 
Notes:  figures in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Figures in brackets are standard errors assuming N/3 
independent observations.  The Q-statistic indicates the Ljung-Box Q-statistic. * and ** denote significance at the 
5 and 1 percent level, respectively, using the adjusted standard errors. 74  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
that remain between a given country and the major world financial centers due 
to currency factors or country factors? Most of the Asian countries experience 
frequent changes in their exchange rates against the yen and the dollar. Finan- 
cial markets in a country like Singapore could be very open, yet observed inter- 
est rates could differ from those in Tokyo or New York because of premiums 
meant to compensate investors for the possibility  of changes in the exchange 
rate. The question of whether the yen is playing an increasing role in the ex- 
change rate policies of  East Asian  countries is important to address, but  it 
should be kept distinct from the question of whether financial links to Tokyo 
(irrespective of currency) are strengthening. 
We can take out currency factors by using the forward exchange market. The 
necessary data are available for six of the countries. I simply express the for- 
eign interest rates so as to be “covered” or hedged against exchange risk. Doing 
so changes the  1988-91  results for Australia and Singapore toward a Tokyo 
effect that is smaller than the New York effect. Most coefficients remain sig- 
nificant, despite the obvious multicollinearity between covered US. and Japa- 
nese interest rates.2’ 
Returning to the longer 1982-92  time period to look for trends in the coef- 
ficients of the covered interest rates, we find that the observed upward trends 
for Tokyo influence in Singapore and Malaysia are not statistically significant 
(when conservative  standard errors  are used).  Singapore,  like  Hong  Kong, 
rather appears to obey a covered  interest parity relationship vis-B-vis dollar 
interest rates.22 
For six of these countries, there exists another way of correcting for possible 
exchange rate changes: direct data on forecasts of market participants collected 
in a monthly survey by the Currency Forecasters’ Digest of White Plains, New 
Y01-k.~~  One advantage of using the survey responses to measure expected ex- 
change rate changes is that the data allow us to test explicitly whether there 
exists an exchange risk premium that creates an international differential in 
interest rates even in the absence of barriers to international capital flows. Such 
a differential would be compensation to risk-averse investors for holding assets 
that they view as risky.24  An advantage of the Currency Forecasters’ Digest 
21. Table 4 in Frankel (1991a), or table 7 in NBER  Working Paper no. 4050. (The Durbin- 
Watson statistics improve substantially when the forward rates are included, confirming that the 
equation that uses covered interest rates is a more appropriate specification.) 
22. These results are from tables 12a and 12b in Chinn and Frankel (1992). 
23. The Currency Forecasters’ Digesr data is proprietary and was obtained by  subscription by 
the Institute for International Economics. 
24. The forward rate data allow us to eliminate factors associated with the currency in which 
countries’ assets are denominated, but they do not allow us to distinguish between two currency 
factors: the exchange risk premium and expectations of depreciation. For the case of Australia, for 
example, the support for covered interest parity suggests that barriers to the movement of capital 
between Sydney and New York are low, and so differences in  interest rates are due to currency 
factors. But when the Australian interest rate is observed to exceed the US.  interest rate, is this 
because the Australian dollar is confidently expected to depreciate, or is it because investors have 
no idea what the exchange rate will do and demand to be compensated for this risk? The survey 
data may  be able to distinguish between these two hypotheses, whereas the forward rate data 
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data in particular is that they are available even for countries like Taiwan and 
Korea, where financial markets are less developed. A potential disadvantage is 
the possibility that  survey data measure the expectations of  market partici- 
pants imperfectly. 
For Singapore, the survey data corroborate the finding from the forward rate 
data that, once expected depreciation is eliminated as a factor, the New York 
effect dominates the Tokyo effect. For Korea, the survey data also show that 
the Tokyo effect becomes smaller than the New York effect. For Australia and 
Taiwan, both effects largely disappear.25 
2.3.4  The Role of the Yen  in Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
The finding that eliminating exchange rate expectations from the calculation 
leaves Tokyo with relatively little effect on local interest rates in most of these 
countries does not necessarily mean that the Japanese influence is not strong. 
It is possible, rather, that much of the influence in the Pacific comes precisely 
through the role of the yen. If Pacific countries assign high weight to the yen 
in setting their exchange rate policies, then their interest rates will be heavily 
influenced by Japanese interest rates. 
No Asian or  Pacific countries have ever pegged their currencies to the yen 
in the postwar period. But neither are there any Pacific countries that the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies as still pegging to the U.S. dollar. (As 
already mentioned, Hong Kong pegs to the dollar, although the colony is not 
an official member of the IMF.) Malaysia, Thailand, and a number of  Pacific 
island countries officially peg to a basket of major currencies and are thought 
to give weight to both the dollar and yen, but the weights are not officially an- 
nounced. 
It is interesting to estimate econometrically the weights given to the dollar, 
yen,  and other major currencies in exchange rate policies of  Asian Pacific 
countries, especially those who follow a basket peg but do not officially an- 
nounce the weights. This involves regressing changes in the value of the cur- 
rency in question against changes in the value of the yen, dollar, and so forth. 
(I work in  changes rather than in levels, among other reasons, because ex- 
change rates have been widely observed to behave as unit-root processes.) 
There is a methodological question of  what numeraire should be used to 
measure the value of  the currencies. A simple solution is to use the special 
drawing right (SDR) as numeraire. This approach suffers from the drawback 
that the SDR is itself a basket of five major currencies, including the dollar and 
yen. An alternative approach is to use purchasing power over local goods (the 
inverse of the local price level) as the numeraire. Whatever the numeraire, un- 
der the null hypothesis that a particular currency is pegged to the dollar or yen, 
or to a weighted basket, the regression results should show this clearly, featur- 
ing even a high R2.  I focus here on the purchasing-power measure. 
25. Table 4 in Frankel (1991a), or table 7 in NBER Working Paper no. 4050. Time trends are 
estimated in tables 13a and 13b in Chinn and Frankel (1992). 76  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 2.9  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Malaysian Ringgit 
Constant  Yen  Dollar  Mark  Pound  Franc  R2  Durbin-Watson 
74.1-91.10  -.0028 
-7.97** 
74.1-76.12  -.0044 
-2.74** 
77.1-79.12  -.MI7 
-  1.821t 
80.1-82.12  -.0041 
-4.14** 
83.1-85.12  -.0014 
-1.55 
86.1-88.12  -.0021 
-3.78** 
88.1-90.12  -.0025 
-5.52** 
.01  .16 
0.55  6.74** 
.05  .15 
0.37  1.29 
.05  .29 
1.27  3.38* 
.00  .11 
0.08  2.17* 
.07  .17 
1.24  2.65** 
-.04  .I2 
-  1.45  2.86** 
-.01  .I7 
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-.01  .28  1.59 
p.01  24  1.59 
-07  .45  1.73 
-0.78 
-.06  .35  1.52 
-0.88 
.12  .32  1.90 
0.98 
-.02  .44  1.49 
-0.24 




Notes: tt,  *, and ** denote significance at the 90,95, and 99 percent levels, respectively. f-statis- 
tics are reported below coefficients. The value of currencies, both domestic and foreign, refers to 
purchasing power over Malaysian goods, as measured by the CPI. 
Regressions of changes in the real value of  the Hong Kong dollar against 
changes in the value of the five major currencies show highly significant coef- 
ficients on the U.S. dollar during the periods 1974-80  and  1984-90  (not re- 
ported here). The weight on the dollar is statistically indistinguishable from 1 
during most of the latter seven-year period, and the R2 reaches 0.96 during the 
last four years. Occasional subperiods show apparently significant weights on 
other currencies (the yen during 1979-81, the franc during 1983-85,  and the 
mark during 1986-88). Overall, however, the numbers bear out Hong Kong’s 
peg to the dollar. 
Regressions of changes in the real value of the Malaysian ringgit against the 
five  major currencies, reported  in table 2.9, give a large  significant weight 
to the dollar. Some subperiods show a significant weight on the mark, and dur- 
ing  1986-88  even  the pound  is  significant. But  the  yen  is not  significant 
during any three-year subperiod. The constant term is negative (and statistic- 
ally  significant),  indicating  a  trend  depreciation,  and  the  R2 is  fairly  low, 
indicating that the basket peg was loose, even if one allows for a crawling 
peg.2h 
The Singapore dollar shows significant weights (of about .2 each) on the 
U.S. dollar and mark during the period 1974-77, as reported in table 2.10. The 
regression for 1977-79  shows a rough basket peg (R2 = 33)  with significant 
26. This turns out to be true of almost all currencies worldwide that purport to be on a basket 
peg (excluding a peg to the SDR). 77  Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific? 
Table 2.10  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in Value of 
Singapore Dollar 
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.13  -.01  -.04  .45  1.55 
.26  -.07  -.OO  .46  1.40 
.25  .09  -.09  .83  1.90 
.22  .07  -.12  .74  1.42 
3.82**  2.05*  -2.04* 
-  .08  -  .02  .07  .41  1.55 
.02  .02  .01  .46  2.59 
0.33*  1.14  0.12 
-  .05  .04  .06  .32  2.31 
-0.42  1.29  0.46 
4.19*  -0.58  -1.26 
2.84**  -0.97  -0.05 
4.820**  2.32*  -1.44 
-0.78  -0.53  0.77 
Notes; ti,  *, and ** denote significance at the 90,95%, and 99 percent level, respectively. t-statistics are 
reported below coefficients. The value of  currencies, both domestic  and  foreign, refers to purchasing 
power over Singapore goods, as measured by the CPI. 
weights of  .09 on the yen, .47 on the dollar, .25 on the mark, and .09 on the 
pound. The weight on the dollar diminishes thereafter, and the weight on the 
yen increases. By  1983-85,  the yen weight (at a significant .20) has temporar- 
ily passed the dollar weight (at a significant .19). From 1986 to 1990 only the 
dollar is significant. 
The results for the real value of  the Thai baht, reported in table 2.11, show 
a very close peg to the dollar from 1974 to 1980, whereupon the dollar weight 
falls somewhat. Beginning in  1986, a pattern emerges of  significant weights 
on the yen and pound, in addition to the dollar. During the period 1988-90, the 
baht  exhibits a close to perfect peg  (R2  = .99) to  a basket  with estimated 
weights of  .82 on the dollar, .13 on the yen, .06 on the mark, and .02 on the 
pound. 
Korea also claimed to have a sort of basket peg in the 198Os, but with large 
adjustments. Regressions of  the change in  the real value of  the won  show a 
statistically significant weight on the value of  the dollar during the period April 
1980-March  1986, with an estimated coefficient of  .4 to .5.  (The Canadian 
dollar, which was reputed to be included in the Korean basket, also shows up 
with a significant coefficient of .2 during part of the period.) There is a signifi- 
cant constant term (the “alpha”) during this period: the value of the won de- 
clined during the early 1980s, whether measured by inflation or depreciation, 
relative to foreign currencies. The dollar, like the other major currencies, is 
insignificant  during the  period  April  1985-March  1987. Its  influence  re- 
emerges from April 1986 to March 1988. But during the final two-year subpe- 
riod, April  1988-March  1990, the yen  (with a highly significant coefficient 78  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 2.11  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in Value of 
Thai Baht 
Constant  Yen  Dollar  Mark  Pound  Franc  R2  Durbin-Watson 
74.1-91.3  -.0039 
8.05** 
74.1-76.12  -.OOOO 
-0.90 
77.1-79.12  -.0010 
-2.35* 
80.1-82.12  -.0061 
-  3.7  1 ** 
83.1-85.12  -.0020 
-2.45* 
86.1-88.12  -.OW6 
-  1.72ti 
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-.oo  1.00  2.05 
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-.05  .96  1.70 
-  I .72tt 
-.I0  .58  1.47 
-0.80 
.09  .32  1.51 
0.89 
.08  .80  2.04 
1.76tt 
-.01  .99  1.77 
-0.22 
Notes: tt,  *, and **  denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are 
reported below coefficients. The value of  currencies, both domestic and foreign, refers to  purchasing 
power over Thai goods, as measured by the CPI. 
estimated at .18) suddenly eclipses the dollar (with an insignificant coefficient 
To summarize, there is some evidence of increased yen influence in the case 
of  the Singapore dollar in the early 1980s and the Thai baht in the late 1980s. 
The only place where the yen  appears to have become as important as the 
dollar is Korea in the last two years of the decade.2* 
2.3.5 
of .11).27 
The Role of the Yen in Reserves and Invoicing 
There is other evidence that the yen is playing an increasing role in the re- 
gion. As table 2.12 shows, Asian central banks in the course of the 1980s in- 
creased their holdings of yen from 13.9 percent of  their foreign exchange re- 
serve portfolios to  17.1 percent.29 Foreign  exchange market  trading in  the 
regional  financial centers of  Singapore and Hong Kong, though still over- 
whelmingly conducted in dollars, now shows a much higher proportion of  trad- 
ing in yen than is the case in Europe (Tavlas and Ozeki 1992,35). 
The yen is also being used more widely to invoice lending and trade in Asia. 
27. The results for the won are reported in Frankel (1992) (with value measured in terms of 
purchasing power. Value is measured also in terms of the SDR in a related paper to be published 
by the Hoover Institution, but the regressions are against the dollar and yen alone). 
28. Further results on a set of nine East Asian currencies are reported  in Frankel and Wei 
(l992b). The Indonesian rupiah turns out to be the clearest case of significant yen influence, which 
is of interest in that Indonesia is also the case where Japanese interest rates are seen to have the 
most strongly increasing influence (table 2.8 here). 
29. The deutsch mark and Swiss franc are the two currencies that suffered the largest loss in 
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Table 2.12  Share of the Yen in Debt-Denomination  and Official Reserve 
Holdings (percentage) 
Yen  Share in 
Official 
Holdings  Yen  Share in External Debt 
Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Total  Asia”  World 
1980  20.0  16.6  19.0  22.0  25.5  19.5  13.9  4.4 
1981  19.3  14.1  16.9  20.6  23.2  17.8  15.5  4.2 
1982  21.0  12.3  13.3  19.2  24.0  11.2  11.6  4.7 
1983  23.3  12.5  14.2  20.0  27.3  18.5  15.5  5.0 
1984  25.0  12.8  21.2  20.0  29.2  20.3  16.3  5.8 
1985  31.7  16.7  26.4  24.9  36.1  25.8  26.9  8.0 
1986  33.9  22.0  30.4  25.5  39.9  29.3  22.9  7.9 
1987  39.4  21.2  35.7  35.2  43.1  36.0  30.0  7.5 
1988  39.3  29.5  37.1  40.5  43.5  37.9  26.1  7.1 
1989  35.2  26.6  36.6  32.6  40.9  35.7  17.5  7.9 
1990  17.1  9.1 
Source: Tavlas and Ozeki (1992.39). 
”Selected Asian countries (not including Japan). 
The countries that incurred large international debts in the  1970s and early 
1980s subsequently shifted the composition away  from dollar-denominated 
debt and toward yen-denominated debt. Table 2.12 shows that the yen  share 
among five major Asian debtors nearly doubled between 1980 and 1988, en- 
tirely at the expense of  the dollar. Table  2.13 shows that the share of  trade 
denominated in yen is greater in Asia than in other regions, and that there was 
an especially rapid increase from 1983 to 1990 in the share of Asian imports 
denominated in yen.3o  Overall, however, it must be concluded that the role of 
the yen in East Asia is still not proportionate to Japan’s importance in trade. 
2.4  Conclusions 
1. The level of trade in East Asia, like trade within the EC and within the 
Western Hemisphere, is biased toward intraregional trade, to a greater extent 
than can be explained naturally by distance. When one allows for the greater 
openness of  the East Asian countries, however, the significance of  the bloc 
effect largely disappears. 
2.  There is no evidence of a special Japan effect within Asia. 
3.  Although growth in Japan, the four NICs, and other East Asian countries 
is rapidly increasing their weight in world output and trade, the statistics do not 
bear out a trend toward intraregional bias of trade and direct investment flows. 
4. The intraregional trade bias did increase in Europe in the 1980s, in the 
30. Tavlas and Ozeki (199  I, 1992) give further statistics  and discussion. 80  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 2.13  Share of the Yen in Denomination of Foreign Wade (percentage) 
~~~  ~ 
Denomination of Exports  Denomination of Import? 
Southeast Asia  All Regions  Southeast Asia  All Regions 
1983  48.0  40.4  2.0  3  .O 
1986  31.5  35.5  9.2  9.7 
1987  36.3  34.1  13.9  11.6 
1988  41.2  34.3  17.5  13.3 
1989  43.5  34.1  19.5  14.1 
1990  48.9  37.5  19.4  14.4 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, Annual Report, as reported in Tavlas and Ozeki (1992,33). 
Western Hemisphere in the late 1980s, and in the grouping that includes the 
United States and Canada with the Asian Pacific countries, that is, APEC. 
5. The APEC trade grouping appears to be the world’s strongest, whether 
judged by  rate of change of  intragroup bias or (as of  1990) by level of  bias. 
Far from being shut out of a strong Asian bloc centered on Japan, the United 
States and Canada are in the enviable position  of belonging  to both of  the 
world’s two strongest groupings. 
6. There is a bit of evidence of Japanese influence in East Asia’sjnancial 
markets, as opposed to trade. Tokyo appears to have increasing influence over 
interest rates in  Singapore, Korea, and Indonesia, Overall, however, its influ- 
ence is still smaller than that of New York. 
7. Some of Japan’s financial influence takes place through a growing role 
for the yen, at the expense of the dollar. There has been a gradual increase in 
the yen’s  relative importance in invoicing of trade and finance in the region, 
and in some countries’ exchange rate policies. 
This still leaves a question raised at the beginning of this essay. Is Japan 
undertaking deliberate policy measures to increase its monetary and financial 
role? Gradually increasing use of the yen internationally is primarily the out- 
come of private decisions by importers, exporters, borrowew, and lenders. It is 
difficult to see signs of deliberate policy actions taken by the Japanese govern- 
ment to increase its financial and monetary influence in Asia. To the contrary, 
until recently  the Japanese government has resisted whatever tendency there 
may be for the yen  to become an international currency in competition with 
the dollar. 
It has been the U.S. government, in the Yen-Dollar Agreement of  1984 and 
in subsequent negotiations, that has been pushing Japan to internationalize the 
yen, to promote its worldwide use in trade, finance, and central bank policies 
(Frankel  1984). It has also been the U.S. government  that has been pushing 
Korea and other East Asian NICs to open up their financial markets, thereby 
allowing Japanese  capital  and Japanese  financial  institutions to  enter these 81  Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific? 
Argentina  Buenos Aires 
Bolivia  La Paz 
Brazil  Sa6 Paulo 
Canada  Ottawa 
Chile  Santiago 
Colombia  Bogot6 
Ecuador  Quito 
countries. It has again been the U.S. government that has been pushing Korea 
and Taiwan to move away from policies to stabilize the value of their currencies 
against the dollar.” The increasing role of the yen in the Asian Pacific may or 
may not be a good idea. But it is an idea that originated in Washington, not 
in Tokyo. 
Mexico  Mexico City 
Paraguay  Asunci6n 
Peru  Lima 
United States  Chicago 
Uruguay  Montevideo 
Venezuela  Caracas 
Appendix 
Countries Used in the Gravity Equation 
Belgium  Brussels 
Denmark  Copenhagen 
France  Paris 
Greece  Athens 
Ireland  Dublin 
Italy  Rome 
The list  shows regional  groupings  and main city. The distance between 
countries was computed as the great-circle distance between the relevant pair 
of cities. (APEC consists of East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
the United States.) 
Netherlands  Amsterdam 
Portugal  Lisbon 
Spain  Madrid 
United Kingdom  London 
West Germany  Bonn 
Austria  Vienna 
Finland  Helsinki 
Norway  Oslo 
Sweden  Stockholm 
3 1. Balassa and Williamson (1990), Noland (1990), and Frankel (1989). Financial negotiations 
between the U.S. Treasury and the governments of Korea and Taiwan were a response to congres- 














































Eastern Europe (3) 
Budapest  Yugoslavia 
Warsaw 
Other Pacific (2) 
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Comment  Robert Z. Lawrence 
In choosing me to comment on this paper, Jeffrey Frankel showed an unusual 
amount of trust, since I  find it hard to view the paper with impartiality. An 
earlier version of the paper won first prize last year in a competition organized 
by the American Express Company. It so happens, a paper that I wrote obtained 
the second prize. 
Notwithstanding my unusual perspective on this work, my overall appraisal 
of  the paper is favorable. I certainly agree with its central conclusion that in 
the trade area, thus far, growth rather than inherent discrimination is primarily 
responsible for the increased regionalization of  Asia. While the work on fi- 
nancial integration is illuminating, it is much less convincing because of  the 
difficulties associated with providing a structural interpretation of the relation- 
ships between the variables. 
I would like to focus my first comment on the basic methodology of  the 
paper. Frankel defines a regional bloc as “a group of countries that are concen- 
trating their trade and financial relationships with each other, in preference to 
the rest of  the world” (emphasis added). He then tests (1) whether trade blocs 
are forming in Asia by  examining if  intraregional trade has increased more 
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rapidly than a gravity model would predict, and (2) Japan’s financial influence 
by using regression analysis. 
Let me deal first with trade. In thinking about the implications of regional 
arrangements, it is important to be precise as to what we mean by the phrase 
“in preference.” The term preference could imply some form of deliberate dis- 
crimination against outsiders-imposed  by policy or prejudice. However, pref- 
erences could also reflect developments driven purely by efficiency considera- 
tions. The evidence from the gravity model tests cannot, of course, distinguish 
between these causes. While Frankel found that intra-Asian trade flows were 
not growing more rapidly than might be expected, even had he found that they 
were, this need not have implied that this development was harmful to the rest 
of the world. 
The conventional answer to the question of whether regional arrangements 
enhance global welfare relates to the relative magnitudes of trade diversion and 
trade creation. These magnitudes, it should be stressed, do not correspond to 
the relative ex post growth of intra- and extraregional flows. Trade diversion 
harms welfare only when the inefficiency cost of buying from a higher-cost 
regional partner is greater than the deadweight gain to consumers of buying 
goods that are not subject to tariffs; that is, global (if not extraregional welfare) 
can be enhanced even when trade is shifted toward a regional partner. For the 
rest of the world, even if trade is thus diverted, there could be offsetting effects 
if regional integration has dynamic effects that stimulate growth. 
Let me argue, moreover, that to evaluate regional arrangements properly, we 
need to move beyond the traditional approach that looks only at the role of the 
removal  of  border  barriers.  Regional  arrangements such  as  EC92 involve 
deeper integration with an extensive program involving increased institutional 
harmonization to complete the internal market. We should really be evaluating 
the precise nature rather than simply the quantity of Asian economic integra- 
tion. A growth in intraregional competition that reflects the weakening of do- 
mestic market power and the ability of domestic firms to collude and prevent 
entry might show up in data in a rapid increase in regional trade, but it could 
also increase the relative access of outsiders. 
I think it is also important to distinguish between the aggregate trade flows 
that Frankel examines and behavior in particular sectors. While I agree that 
overall trade flows are driven by Asian growth, I think that in a few sectors, 
particularly machinery  and electronics, there is more evidence that keiretsu 
activities are particularly strong. In these industries there appears to be an ex- 
tensive and growing network associated with the activities of Japanese firms. 
These practices have made it relatively difficult for foreigners to enter the Japa- 
nese  market,  and there  is  a concern that  the  spread  of  such arrangements 
throughout Asia could have similar effects. So while I applaud Frankel’s efforts 
as an important first step, I think we need to move beyond simply examining 
trade flows, toward examining institutional and industrial practices. 
I had more problems with the evidence on financial behavior. In particular, 87  Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific? 
the regressions can be thought of as statistical summaries of the historic rela- 
tionships between some highly endogenous variables, but it is hard to provide 
a structural interpretation for the results.  The increased correlation between 
variables does not necessarily imply increased integration. It could simply re- 
flect similar responses to common external shocks. Indeed, a major reason for 
similar responses within Asian countries could of course be similar pressures 
from the United  States. In other words, closer links with the United  States 
could lead to increased correlation in Asian behavior but reduced correlation 
with the United States, if U.S.  policies brought pressures to shift Asian ex- 
change rates. 
I am particularly  concerned about several of the regressions in which the 
coefficients sum to far more than unity. We might expect, for example, that a 
1 percent increase in expected  global inflation would raise nominal interest 
rates throughout the world by 1 percent, yet these regressions, if taken literally, 
suggest that such a shock would lead to changes far in excess of (or below) 
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